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The Quiet Undoing: How Regional Electricity
Market Reforms Threaten State Clean Energy
Goals
Danny Cullenwardt & Shelley Welton
In a series of largely unnoticed but extremely consequential moves, two
regional electricity market operators are pursuing reforms to make it more
difficult for states to achieve their clean energy goals. The federal energy
regulator, FERC, has already approved one such reform and ordered a second
market operator to go farther in punishing state-supported clean energy
resourcesthan it had initiallyproposed. In this Essay, we bring to light the ways
in which the intricate, technicalreforms underway in regionalelectricity markets
threaten state climate change objectives and the durabilityofFERC's regional
market constructs. If FERC allows private market operators to impose their
policy preferences on participating states-or if FERC requires pro-fossil
market designs progressin decarbonizing the electricity sector will likely slow.
At the same time, the potentialfor greater regional cooperation in electricity
markets a critical strategy for integrating a high penetration of renewable
energy onto the electricity grid will diminish.
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I. Introduction'
In the past year alone, the Trump Administration has announced two brazen
new strategies to prop up ailing coal and nuclear power plants.2 Each of these
has been the subject of many headlines. 3 Neither, however, has yet come to
fruition-in large part because they have been opposed by the key federal agency
in charge of wholesale electricity markets, the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC).4 FERC's commissioners have all spoken out against any
strategies that would undo the decades of progress that the agency has made in
crafting robust, well-functioning regional energy markets. At the same time, in
a series of lawsuits challenging state support for nuclear power, FERC has
encouraged the federal courts to defer to FERC's decisions about how best to

1.
We are grateful for comments and feedback from Steve Weissman, Ari Peskoe, Justin
Gundlach, Michael Panfil, Robbie Orvis, and Miles Farmer. Any errors and all opinions are ours alone.

2.

Department of Energy Grid Resiliency Pricing Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 46,940 (Oct. 10,

2017) (proposing a rule to FERC that would require ISOs and RTOs to compensate coal and nuclear
power plants for their full costs, independent of market prices); White House, Statement from the Press
Secretary on Fuel-Secure Power Facilities (June 1, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingsstatements/statement-press-secretary-fuel-secure-power-facilities/
[https://perma.cc/M7TX-666A]

(directing Secretary of Energy Rick Perry "to prepare immediate steps to stop the loss of' fuel-secure
resources); Letter from FirstEnergy Solutions Corp. to Department of Energy Secretary James Richard
Perry (Mar. 29, 2018), https://statepowerproject.files.wordpress.com/2018/03/fes-202c-application.pdf

[https://perma.cc/D2GN-H89S] (requesting an emergency order to require cost recovery for FirstEnergy's
coal and nuclear power plants in PJM, pursuant to Section 202(c) of the Federal Power Act).
3.
See, e.g., Steven Mufson, Trump Orders Energy Secretary Perry to Halt Shutdown
of
Coal
and
Nuclear
Plants,
WASH.
POST
(June
1,
2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/trump-officials-preparing-to-use-cold-waremergency-powers-to-protect-coal-and-nuclear-plants/2018/06/01/230f0778-65a9-1 1e8-a69cb944de66d9e7_story.html?utm term=.cc80aaa8e373 [https://perma.cc/63QZ-W7PB]; Brad Plumer,
Trump Orders a Lifeline for Struggling Coal and Nuclear Plants, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/01/climate/trump-coal-nuclear-power.html
[https://perma.cc/LNY646VH]; Timothy Puko, Energy Department Urges Pricing Shift that Could Bolster Coal, Nuclear, WALL
ST. J. (Sept. 29, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/energy-department-urges-pricing-shift-that-couldbolster-coal-nuclear-1506698449 [https://perma.cc/3WG3-TKR8].

4.
FERC, Grid Reliability and Resilience Pricing, 162 FERC ¶ 61,012 (2018) (denying
Sec. Perry's proposed rule and opening a new proceeding to consider grid resiliency issues).
5.
Id.; see also U.S. Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, Full
Committee Oversight Hearing of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (June 12, 2018),
https://www.energy.senate.gov/public/index.cfmI/2018/6/full-committee-oversight-hearing-of-thefederal-energy-regulatory-commission [https://perma.cc/6P3K-QMJH] (featuring testimony from all five
FERC Commissioners).
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manage the intersection of state clean energy goals and federally overseen
electricity markets. 6
FERC's stance in these debates might seem to provide some comfort that
the agency will refuse political efforts to stymie the clean energy transition by
propping up fossil fuel resources. But in fact, in a pair of a deeply divided and
technically dense decisions, the Commission has recently approved two
extraordinary market reforms that threaten to undermine state clean energy
goals.' These decisions, we submit, present a "quiet undoing" of state progress
in tackling climate change, and although they are less blatant than President
Trump's dramatic proposals, they are pernicious in their own right.
FERC's reforms have gotten little attention due to their maddeningly
technocratic veneer. In this Essay, we describe the Commission's aggressive
interventions to bring to light the ways in which its recent reforms present a
serious threat to states' autonomy over their energy mix-at the same time that
state clean energy policies are shaping up to be the only progress forward on
climate change under the Trump Administration.
II. The Battles in Eastern Markets
In this Part, we begin by describing the basic structure of regional energy
markets. Next, we turn to the role that state financial support plays in determining
market outcomes, which leads to tension between different kinds of generators.
Finally, we describe the reforms undertaken by two East Coast market operators,
which are pursuing market designs that aim to "correct" for state policy choices,
and in so doing, frustrate state clean energy policy goals.
A. Energy and Capacity Market Basics
At the dawn of the U.S. electricity industry in the late nineteenth century,
energy regulation was a matter left exclusively to the states. Over time, however,

6.
Brief for the United States and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission as Amici
Curiae in Support of Defendants-Respondents and Affirmance at 10, Vill. of Old Mill Creek v. Star, Nos.

17-2433 & 17-2445 (consolidated) (7th Cir. May 29, 2018); see also Danny Cullenward & Shelley
Welton, Will FERC Uphold State Support for Clean Energy?, UTILITY DIVE (June 4, 2018),
https://www.utilitydive.com/news/will-ferc-uphold-state-support-for-clean-energy/524819/

[https://perma.cc/4YLR-UUWY].

The Second and Seventh Circuits subsequently adopted FERC's

position, declining to preempt state subsidies for nuclear energy while also indicating that FERC retains

the authority to impose punitive wholesale electricity market designs. Elec. Power Supply Ass'n v. Star,
Nos. 17-2433 & 17-2445, slip op. at *7 (7th Cir. Sept. 13, 2018); Coal. Competitive Elec. v. Zibelman,
No. 17-2654cv, slip op. at *6 (2d Cir. Sept. 27, 2018).
7.
See infra Section I.C.
8.
For two important exceptions, see Miles Farmer & Bruce Ho, FederalPower Rules
Threaten New England Renewable Energy, NAT'L RES. DEFENSE COUNCIL BLOG (Apr. 10, 2018),
https://www.nrdc.org/experts/bruce-ho/federal-power-rules-threaten-new-england-renewable-energy
[https://perma.cc/6EPQ-2RE9]; and David Roberts, Trump's Crude Bailout ofDirty Power PlantsFailed,
but A Subtler Bailout Is Underway, Vox (Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.vox.com/energy-andenvironment/2018/3/23/17146028/ferc-coal-natural-gas-bailout-mopr [https://perma.cc/J5H7-HSKT].
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the creation and integration of federal authority has altered the regulatory
landscape.9 The Federal Power Act of 1935 created the enduring divide between
federal and state authority in the electricity sector that applies today: the federal
government oversees interstate "wholesale" electricity sales, whereas states
retain control over "retail" sales and "facilities used for the generation of electric
energy." 0 States have long relied on the Federal Power Act's reservation of state
control over generation as an explicit sanction of states' authority to control their
own resource mix." And state control over generation has persisted, even as
federal regulators have increasingly ushered market-based competition into the
industry under their authority to ensure "just and reasonable" interstate
wholesale rates. 12

The modem FERC was created in 1977 and began in the late 1990s to
encourage (but not require) federally regulated electricity markets, which now
serve two-thirds of national electricity demand.13 These markets sought to
replace the previous system of vertically integrated utilities and bilateral
transactions with a more robust and transparent market mechanism for
facilitating the exchange of power among utilities.14 Through a series of orders,
FERC asked utilities to voluntarily join regional market constructs known as
Independent System Operators (ISOs) and Regional Transmission Organizations
(RTOs), subject to the approval of their home states. 15 (For convenience, we will
refer only to RTOs in this essay, although our analysis applies equally to ISOs
as well.)

9.
For an overview, see SCOTT HEMPLING, REGULATING PUBLIC UTILITY
PERFORMANCE: THE LAW OF MARKET STRUCTURE, PRICING AND JURISDICTION § 3.A.1 (2013). See
generally RICHARD F. HIRSH, POWER Loss: THE ORIGINS OF DEREGULATION AND RESTRUCTURING IN
THE AMERICAN ELECTRICITY UTILITY SYSTEM (1999) (charting the course of electricity law in the
twentieth century).

10.
16 U.S.C. § 824(b) (2018).
11.
See Hughes v. Talen Energy Marketing, LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1299 (2016) (holding
that states act within their traditional domain by "encouraging production of new or clean generation" so
long as they do not condition programs on federal wholesale market participation); Elec. Power Supply

Ass'n v. Star, slip op. at *6 (affirming "state authority over power generation" in upholding state support
for nuclear power against a federal preemption challenge).
12.
See David Spence, Can Law Manage Competitive Energy Markets?, 93 CORNELL

L. REV. 765, 772-75 (2008) (describing the U.S. transition to electricity markets).
13.
FERC, ENERGY PRIMER: A HANDBOOK OF ENERGY MARKET BASICS 1, 40 (2015).
14.
See Spence, supra note 12, at 770-72.
15.
Order No. 888, Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Nondiscriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities, Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities

and Transmitting Utilities, 75 FERC ¶ 61,080 (1996); Order No. 2000, Regional Transmission
Organizations, 89 FERC ¶ 61,285 (1999). RTOs are very similar to ISOs; for the purposes of this Essay,
we will refer to RTOs to mean either RTOs or ISOs, leaving aside the subtle differences in their legal and
historical origins.
16.
FERC first created ISOs with Order 888, which established open-access interstate
transmission policy. FERC later refined these concepts with Order 2000, which created RTOs more
specifically. Some market operators qualify as both an ISO and an RTO; the names currently in use

typically reflect the initial origin of the operators' formation (i.e., in response to Order 888 or Order 2000),
rather than any particular legal or organizational function.
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Unlike FERC and its state counterparts, these market operators are private,
non-profit organizations charged with developing electricity markets that ensure
open access to the transmission systems they operate. Market operators develop
and reform market rules via complex stakeholder processes; some use weighted
sector voting by RTO members (predominantly utilities and generators) to
advance proposals.1
Although state governments and civil society can
participate as stakeholders in these processes, market operators' independent
governing boards make the ultimate decisions about what gets filed with
FERC. 18
RTOs operate two broad categories of federally regulated electricity
markets: energy and capacity markets. 19 Energy markets are the more intuitive
of the two. RTOs operate real-time and day-ahead energy markets for electricity,
matching supply and demand based on customer load, power plant generators'
bids, and the physical constraints of the transmission network they operate.
RTOs select the lowest-cost bids (expressed as dollars per megawatt-hour
($/MWh) of electrical energy) capable of serving customer loads; all generators
whose bids are accepted receive the market-clearing price, which is set by the
highest accepted bid necessary to meet demand.
Capacity markets address a different issue. Not only must electrical energy
be available at the instant it is demanded, but regulators must also ensure that
sufficient generation capacity will be available to meet future projected demand.
Some foresight is needed because power plant construction and permitting take
years, not seconds. Many areas of the country rely on state- or utility-level
"resource adequacy" obligations that achieve this outcome by requiring utilities
to own or contract for future electricity supply adequate to meet their anticipated
customer demand. 20 But in several of the RTOs-located predominantly in the
eastern part of the country-market operators have instead decided to ensure
adequate future electricity supply through running separate, centralized capacity
markets. 21

17.
See generally Kyungjin Yoo & Seth Blumsack, Can Capacity Markets Be Designed
by Democracy?, 53 J. REG. ECON. 127 (2018) (breaking down PJM's voting members into categories).
18.
See, e.g., Stephanie Lenhart, Natalie Nelson-Marsh, Elizabeth J. Wilson & David
Solan, Electricity Governance and the Western Energy Imbalance Market in the United States: The

Necessity of Interorganizational Collaboration, 19 ENERGY RES. & Soc. SCI. 94 (2016); see also
Benjamin A. Stafford & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Winds of Change in Energy Systems: Policy Implementation,
Technology Deployment, and Regional Transmission Organizations, 21 ENERGY RES. & Soc. SCI. 222

(2016).
19.
Astute readers might add a third category: ancillary services markets, which procure
a highly technical set of resources that help ensure grid load balancing at the speed of light. Although
critically important, ancillary services are not implicated in this Essay's focus on jurisdictional tension.
20.
For a more in-depth discussion, see James Bushnell, Michaela Flagg & Erin
Mansur, Capacity Markets at a Crossroads § 2 (Energy Institute at Haas Working Paper No. 278, 2017).
21.
Four of the nation's seven wholesale electricity markets have a centralized capacity
market: the Midcontinent Independent System Operator (MISO), the New York Independent System
Operator (NYISO), PJM Interconnection (PJM), and the Independent System Operator of New England
(ISO-NE). Three do not: the California Independent System Operator (CAISO), the Southwest Power

110

The Quiet Undoing
In centralized capacity markets, the regional market operator first
determines the amount of future generation capacity the region needs throughout
its footprint, typically three years in the future. Then, the RTO accepts bids from
power plant owners that reflect the price at which they would commit to have
future generation available when called upon.22 Just as with energy markets, the
market-clearing price for capacity markets (typically expressed as dollar per
megawatt ($/MW) of capacity) is based on the amount necessary to compensate
a sufficient number of generators with the necessary capacity. However, the
economics of capacity markets are significantly more complex, due to the variety
of market designs, the bidding strategies of market participants, and the presence
of state and federal subsidies.23
B. A Brief Overview of ProminentSubsidies
Like all energy markets, electric energy and capacity markets include
market participants that receive a wide range of subsidies.24 Fossil fuel
generators receive an implicit subsidy because most are not forced to internalize
the costs of environmental pollution, including greenhouse gas emissions.2 5
Although significant, these externalized social costs are less visible than the
explicit financial subsidies that many resources also receive. As one FERC
commissioner has noted, "[s]ince 1950, the federal government has provided
roughly a trillion dollars in energy subsidies, of which 65 percent has gone to
fossil fuel technologies." 2 6 Clean energy has increasingly received explicit
subsidies, in forms including federal tax credits for wind energy (provided on a
$/MWh basis),27 state renewable portfolio standards (which require utilities to
procure a certain share of their total resource mix from qualified renewables,

Pool (SPP), and the Electricity Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT). Most areas of the western and
southeastern United States lack wholesale markets of any kind. Id.

22.
Companies that reduce electricity demand may also bid in to provide "demand
response" services and energy efficiency, in lieu of power plant generation capacity. For an overview, see
generally Yingqi Liu, Demand Response and Energy Efficiency in the Capacity Resource Procurement:
Case Studies of Forward Capacity Markets in ISO New England, PJM and Great Britain, 100 ENERGY
POL'Y 271 (2017).
23.
See generally Bushnell et al., supra note 20.
24.
We use the term "subsidy" for convenience and not to express judgment as to the
merits of a particular policy.
25.

NATIONAL

ACADEMIES OF SCIENCE, HIDDEN

COSTS OF ENERGY: UNPRICED

CONSEQUENCES OF ENERGY PRODUCTION AND USE § 3 (2009).

26.
Calpine Corp. v. PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Order Rejecting Proposed Tariff
Revisions, Granting in Part and Denying in Part Complaint, and Instituting Proceeding under Section 206

of the Federal Power Act, 163 FERC ¶ 61,236, at pp. 92-93 (2018) [hereinafter "PJM Order"] (Glick,
Comm'r, dissenting) (citations omitted).
27.

Energy

North Carolina Clean Energy Technology Center, DSIRE Database, Renewable

Production

Tax

Credit

http://programs.dsireusa.org/system/program/detail/734

(PTC)

(Feb.

28,

2018),

[https://perma.cc/4EHF-EN99].
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often through the purchase of environmental attributes called RECs),28 and state
support to keep nuclear power plants in operation.2 9
Each of these policies affects capacity market outcomes. To take just one
example, consider the case of a wind farm that receives financial support from
the state and federal governments. In this case, the wind farm will be able to bid
less than its "true" costs because the power plant's owner does not need to
recover this full amount from the capacity market as a result of the subsidies she
receives. This will have two effects. First, the wind farm is more likely to
produce a winning bid, which would make it eligible to receive the capacity
market's clearing price. Second, by bidding in at a lower price, the wind farm
may decrease the overall market-clearing price, reducing the compensation all
successful bidders receive.
What should one make of these consequences? Given the breadth of
subsidies that permeate energy markets, there is no obvious way to parse which
subsidies should or should not be allowed to influence markets.30 Historically,
RTOs have hesitated to make any value judgments in this regard, identifying
themselves as neutral technocrats charged with developing efficient market
designs within the policy confines imposed on them by state and federal
policymakers-even when those policies work at competing ends from a
theoretical economic perspective. 31 Consequently, market operators that follow
this philosophy have generally attempted to accommodate the heterogeneous
policy preferences of their member states.
As the ambition of many states' clean energy policies grows and diverges
with respect to that of their neighbors, however-and as U.S. electricity markets
find themselves with excess capacity-market operators are increasingly
viewing heterogeneous state policies as a threat to economically efficient
markets. From the perspective of a non-renewable power plant, the lower market

28.
See generally GALEN BARBOSE, U.S. RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARDs, 2017
ANNUAL STATUS REPORT, LBNL REPORT No. 2001031, 1, 8 (July 2017). Renewable Energy Certificates
(RECs) are created by state law to represent the environmental attribute of pollution-free energy that may
be "bundled" with renewable energy generation or sold separately as a tradable commodity. See generally

WSPP Inc., Order Conditionally Accepting Service Schedule R, 139 FERC

¶ 61,061

(2012) (discussing

the legal structure of RECs and disclaiming federal jurisdiction over unbundled RECs).
29.
See, e.g., Joel B. Eisen, The New(Clear?) Electricity Federalism: Federal
Preemption ofStates' "Zero Emissions Credit"Programs, ECOLOGY L. CURRENTs 149 (2018) (arguing

that states' use of ZEC subsidies that reference wholesale prices are preempted); Ari Peskoe, State Clean
Energy Policies at Risk: Courts Should Not Preempt Zero Emissions Credits for Nuclear Plants,
ECOLOGY L. CURRENTS 172 (2018) (arguing that such policies should not be preempted).

30.
See PJM Order, supra note 26, at pp. 92-95 (Glick, Comm'r, dissenting); N.Y. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n v. N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 158 FERC ¶ 61,137, at p. 19 (2017) (Bay, Comm'r,
concurring) ("The fact of the matter is that all energy resources receive federal subsidies, and some
resources have received subsidies for decades.." (citing U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Direct Federal
Financial Interventions and Subsidies in Energy in Fiscal Year 2016 (Apr. 2018),
https://www.eia.gov/analysis/requests/subsidy/pdf/subsidy.pdf [https://perma.cc/GAM7-L4DW])).

31.
See Stafford & Wilson, supra note 18, at 229 (quoting RTO staffer explaining: "We
are a taker of policy not a maker of policy . . .. We don't create policy. We attempt to interpret policy as
handed to us."); see also ISO New England Inc., 162 FERC ¶ 61,205, at P. 26 (2018) (FERC insisting that
the agency remains resource neutral) [hereinafter "ISO-NE Order"].
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prices to which state clean energy subsidies contribute translate into lower
revenues. These price impacts become more relevant as renewable energy
resources make up a growing share of capacity additions in federally regulated
energy markets. Whereas most new generation capacity in the 2000s came from
non-renewable resources, more than half of the nameplate capacity added since
2010 comes from renewable facilities.32 But there is no free lunch: the full costs
of these facilities are paid by a combination of capacity market participants (with
costs ultimately borne by utility customers) and taxpayers. Critically, renewables
do not impose direct costs on legacy fossil generators, although they may capture
market share and therefore reduce fossil generators' revenues. Moreover,
however they are financed, these additions to the grid help to satisfy the region's
needs for additional capacity.33
The substantial impact of these policies, then, is to redistribute power plant
compensation levels through state support for certain resources-largely away
from one set of resources (fossil fuel generators) and towards another (new
renewable energy generation).34 One could view this result as a problem
undermining theoretically ideal markets-or, as we prefer, simply as the
inevitable consequence of hard-won state progress toward decarbonization in the
absence of a federal price on carbon. Below, we describe the view taken by
certain market operators and recently endorsed by FERC, before explaining why
we think it is a blinkered approach to the long-term challenges confronting
electricity markets and electricity federalism.
C. Case Studies
Two regional markets stand out for having gone the furthest in restructuring
their capacity markets in response to state clean energy policies: New England
(ISO-NE) and the mid-Atlantic (PJM). A divided FERC accepted New
England's reforms earlier this year. More recently, the Commission held that
PJM's proposals do not go far enough in insulating markets from state clean
energy policies, leading FERC to demand even more stringent reforms from
PJM. Here, we summarize these intricate reforms in plain English to help a

&

Bushnell et al., supra note 20, at 4243.
32.
33.
Renewable capacity presents additional technical grid integration challenges due to
the fact that grid operators often cannot dispatch it at will and therefore individual facilities require backup
resources to ensure system reliability. Id. at 4246; see generally JOACHIM SEEL, ANDREW D. MILLS
RYAN H. WISER,

IMPACTS OF HIGH VARIABLE RENEWABLE ENERGY FUTURES ON WHOLESALE

ELECTRICITY PRICES, AND ON ELECTRIC-SECTOR DECISION MAKING, LBNL REP. No. 2001163 (MAY
2018). But RTOs are not currently asserting challenges with integrating renewables as a basis for their
proposed reforms, and so we consider these challenges to be beyond the scope of this Essay.
34.
Existing nuclear energy power plants are also affected by low capacity prices and
the rise of state-subsidized renewables. In many cases, however, states with large nuclear fleets have
created state policies to support these resources using compensation mechanisms called Zero Emission
Credits (ZECs) that mirror the RECs awarded to renewable generators. See generally Eisen, supra note
29; Peskoe, supra note 29.
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broader set of readers understand why these changes portend a troubling turn for
energy federalism and clean energy politics.
1. ISO-NE
New England is the first region to have adopted a substantial re-design of
its capacity market to respond to state renewable energy policies. In January
2018, ISO-NE responded to low capacity market prices and the expected surge
in regional clean energy by proposing a novel two-stage capacity auction, which
FERC approved two months later.35 In the first stage, resources receiving state
"sponsorship" 3 6 must bid in at an administratively determined "minimum offer
price" (also called a "MOPR")-thus eliminating the possibility that statesupported renewable resources might suppress capacity market prices by
submitting lower bids that factor in their state support.37 In practice, this structure
means that few state-sponsored resources will clear the first-stage capacity
auction.38
A second stage then attempts to shift capacity commitments from near-endof-life generation to state-sponsored (typically renewable) resources by allowing
older resources to name a price at which they would be willing to transfer their
capacity commitments to state-supported renewables and retire.3 9 In essence, this
design means that state-sponsored renewables may only enter the market after
ratepayers first buy out old fossil fuel or nuclear generators, which then receive
a severance payment equal to the difference between the first (higher) and second
(lower) capacity auction prices. 40 Under this market design, renewable and other
state-supported resources receive less revenue from the capacity market than
their fossil-fuel counterparts. ISO-NE celebrates this design for "closely
coordinating the entry (of sponsored) and exit (of retiring) capacity resources. "41
Although FERC approved this design in March 2018, three of five
commissioners wrote separately to express reservationS 42 and a fourth

35.

See generally ISO-NE Order, supra note 31.

36.
ISO-NE's tariff defines a "Sponsored Policy Resource" as one that is renewable or
clean and receives "an out-of-market" revenue source. Tariff § 1.2.2 (quoted in ISO-NE Order, supra note
31, at P. 3 n.6).
37.
See ISO New England, Transmittal Letter re: Revisions to ISO New England
Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff Related to Competitive Auctions with Sponsored Policy

Resources, Docket No. ER18-619-000, at 5-6 (Jan. 8, 2018) [hereinafter "ISO-NE Transmittal Letter"].
38.

See Partial Protest and Comments of the Mass. Attorney General, ISO New

England, FERC Docket No. ER-18-000, at 2 (Jan. 29, 2018).
39.

The second stage is conducted through a sealed-bid auction, where near-end-of-life

generators' bids are matched with bids from renewable resources. ISO-NE Transmittal Letter, supra note
37, at 6.
40.
Id. at 21 (calling these "severance payments"); ISO-NE Order, supra note 31, at 5.
41.

ISO-NE Transmittal Letter, supra note 37, at 6.

42.
See ISO-NE Order, supra note 31 at p. 57 (LaFleur, Comm'r, concurring in part);
id. at p. 60 (Powelson, Comm'r, dissenting); id. at p. 65 (Glick, Comm'r, dissenting in part and concurring
in part). However, much of the debate centered on one particular paragraph discussing FERC's intended
"standard solution." See id. at P. 22. We note that these concerns were expressed by the Commission's
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subsequently expressed agreement with some of these concerns.43 It is thus
unsurprising that several petitions for rehearing are pending.4 4 We turn below to
our arguments as to why FERC should reconsider its approval of these reforms,
after exploring the second regional capacity market transformation currently
underway.
2. PJM
PJM took a different tack than ISO-NE in its capacity market reforms,
largely due to fierce infighting within the region as to their necessity and
advisability. Unable to reach stakeholder agreement on a single path forward,
PJM filed two alternative proposals with FERC in April 2018, expressing its
preference for one but leaving the ultimate choice to the Commission.45 Each
proposal suggests a different way to deal with what PJM calls "subsidized
resources."

46

Under PJM's preferred option, "Capacity Repricing," the market operator
would run the market one time with "subsidized resources" included at their selfdetermined bid price, to figure out which resources receive capacity
obligations. 47 Then, the market would be run a second time, with subsidized bids
"repriced to a competitive level" in order to set higher compensation levels to be
paid to all resources that cleared the first market. 48 Alternatively, PJM proposed
extending its "minimum offer price rule extension" (or MOPR-Ex)-which
currently requires some resources to submit mandated minimum bids-to state-

supported resources, with the possible exception of resources needed specifically

two Democratic members (LaFleur and Glick) as well as one Republican (Powelson), who subsequently
retired from the Commission well ahead of the end of his term. Rod Kuckro & Sam Mintz, Powelson
Upends
FERC
with
His
Departure.
ENERGYWIRE
(June
29,
2018),
https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060087361 [https://perma.cc/7ZTE-B666](highlighting Commissioner

Powelson's previous experience as a state utility regulator and his opposition to the Trump
Administration's most aggressive attempts to bail out coal and nuclear power plants).
43.
Gavin Bade, Chatterjee OpposesMOPR as 'StandardSolution'for State Policies,
UTILITY DIVE (Apr. 19, 2018), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/chatterjee-opposes-mopr-as-standardsolution-for-state-policies/521731/ [https://perma.cc/8R97-9ZHF] (reporting Commissioner Chatterjee's
reservations about a paragraph in the decision that suggested the MOPR reforms should be a standard
response to state clean energy subsidies).
44.
See FERC, Order Granting Rehearings for Further Consideration, ISO New

England Docket No. ER18-619-001 (May 7, 2018).
45.
See PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Transmittal Letter re: Capacity Repricing or in
the Alternative MOPR-Ex Proposal: Tariff Revisions to Address Impacts of State Public Policies on the

PJM Capacity Market, FERC Docket No. ER18-1314-000, at 17 (Apr. 9, 2018) (hereinafter "PJM
Transmittal Letter") ("After a lengthy PJM stakeholder process on this challenging issue, two alternatives
emerged, but neither could gain the two-thirds affirmative sector vote needed for endorsement.").
46.
See id., Attachment A: Revisions to the PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff,
Option A, § 5.14(j); id., Attachment C: Revisions to the PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff, Option

B, § 5.14(h) (setting forth PJM's complex proposed definitions for "actionable subsidy").
47.
Id. at p. 42.
48.
Id. at pp. 42-43, 51.
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to meet state renewable portfolio standards. 49 In this model, covered renewables
would only clear the capacity market if they were cost-competitive with other
resource types after factoring out any state support.5 0
In a move that stunned many, FERC rejected both of these proposals in a
3-2 decision issued June 29, 2018-but not because it thought they intruded too
deeply into states' sovereignty over their own resource mix. Instead, the essence
of FERC's order was that neither went far enough in insulating markets from
state policy choices. 51 For this reason, the Commission decided to declare PJM's
existing capacity market rules "unjust and unreasonable," and to initiate its own
"paper hearing" to consider yet a third alternative capacity market reform. 52
The Commission's preferred approach would expand the MOPR to all
resources that "receive out-of-market payments," while allowing state-supported
renewable resources to choose to remove themselves from the capacity market
"along with a commensurate amount of load, for some period of time." 53 it

analogized this structure to PJM's existing "Fixed Resource Requirement"
(FRR) option, which allows a utility to elect to secure its capacity obligations via
bilateral contracts made outside the region's centralized capacity market. 54 The
majority admitted in its order that this proposal leaves many questions
unanswered about how the FRR construct should apply to renewable resources. 5
For this reason, it requested interested parties to file comments on FERC's
proposal within 60 days.5 6
Two FERC commissioners-as it happens, the two Democratic
Commissioners whose appointments are required by statute to maintain
ideological balance on the five-member Commission5 7-offered
vigorous
dissents. One decried the majority's procedural choices, arguing that the
Commission's decision to open a paper hearing focused on a modified FRR
constituted a rush-job end-run around the region's stakeholder processes and
mechanisms of state engagement.58 The other focused on the substantive
reasoning underpinning the majority's FRR proposal, arguing that the

49.
Id. at p. 1; see also id. at p. 15 (describing how its proposals create certain "nonactionable" subsidies).
50.
Id. at 43.
51.
FERC found "Capacity Repricing" to be too generous to renewable resources, since
this approach would have awarded renewable resources a higher capacity price in addition to their state
support. PJM Order, supra note 26, at 1163-68. Regarding the "MOPR-Ex" proposal, FERC found PJM's
proposed exception for resources necessary to meet state renewable portfolio standards to be
unsupportable. Id. at ¶¶ 100-06.
52.
The Commission instituted this paper hearing under the authority provided to it in
Section 206 of the Federal Power Act, which allows it to void utility rates found to be unjust and
unreasonable. See 16 U.S.C. § 824e (2018); PJM Order, supra note 26, at¶ 149.
53.
PJM Order, supra note 26, at 118, 160.
54.
Id.
55.
Id. at¶¶164-71.
56.
Id. at 1172.
57.
42 U.S.C. § 7171(b)(1) (2018).
58.
PJM Order, supra note 26, at pp. 82-84 (LaFleur, Comm'r, dissenting).
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Commission fundamentally misconstrues the relationship between federally
overseen markets and state energy policies in deciding that the goal of market
design is to "'mitigate' state efforts to shape the generation mix." 59 Below, we
explain why we find this second critique particularly compelling, before turning
to discuss the broader implications of FERC's rulings on ISO-NE's and PJM's
proposed reforms.
III. A Dangerous Transformation in the Role of RTOs
For readers not steeped in energy market theory, it is tempting to view these
capacity market reform debates as arcane and technocratic squabbles. But
construing these changes as nothing more than inside baseball would be a major
mistake. In this section, we describe how capacity market debates highlight a
growing tension between state clean energy goals and federal electricity
markets-one that threatens to undermine the delicate balance at the heart of
U.S. energy law. In the next Part, we explain the larger federalism and clean
energy implications of FERC's and certain RTOs' apparent disdain for state
policy objectives.
A. The Contested Hierarchyof State Policies and FederalMarket Prices
Although ISO-NE and PJM have responded with different capacity market
modifications, their proposed reforms-and FERC's responses-are driven by
similar concerns. All paint these reforms as striking a balance that resolves the
fundamental tension between "investor confidence" as the touchstone of
capacity markets' "integrity," on the one hand, and concededly legitimate state
policy goals, on the other. 0 When allegedly impossible to reconcile, FERC and
the market operators have "favored the preservation of competitively-based
capacity pricing" over accommodation of state clean energy goals.61
This favoritism inverts the proper relationship between state public policy
objectives and the oblique aim of "investor confidence" in capacity markets. The
Federal Power Act explicitly reserves authority over generation resources to the
states. 62 As the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed, 63 the Act allows states broad
control over the type of resources they prefer, including the ability to "limit new

59.

Id. at p. 87 (Glick, Comm'r, dissenting).

60.

ISO-NE Order, supra note 31, at

129; PJM Order,

supra note 26, at 111, 150. But

see id. at p. 90 (Glick, Comm'r, dissenting) (criticizing FERC for focusing on "investor confidence" as
the critical issue in the ISO-NE Order and then shifting, without explanation or serious mention of

"investor confidence," to a new market "integrity" standard in the PJM Order).
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61.
ISO-NE Transmittal Letter, supra note 37, at 5; ISO-NE Order, supra note 31, at
(endorsing this decision); PJM Order, supra note 26, at ¶¶150-56.

jurisdiction ...

62.
See 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2018) (providing that the Commission "shall not have
over facilities used for the generation of electric energy").
63.
See Hughes v. Talen Energy Marketing, LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1299 (2016).
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construction to more expensive, environmentally-friendly units." 64 The policies
that FERC is now targeting as "interferences" that threaten the "integrity" of its
otherwise "perfect" markets are in fact perfectly legitimate state efforts to reward
and promote different (and worthy) objectives: healthy citizens and a stable
climate.65 What the Federal Power Act gives, FERC and the RTOs should not be
allowed to take away through policies that subserviate state goals to investor
earnings. 66

Indeed, "investor confidence" and the ill-defined concept of "market
integrity" are not-and should not be-end goals for capacity markets.67
Although these concepts are worthwhile in the abstract, they are not self-obvious,
sacrosanct objectives that can justify a transfer of economic wealth made in
retaliation against legitimate state policy decisions. For one thing, we see no
reason to focus exclusively on the confidence of those who invested in legacy
fossil resources, while destabilizing the investment environment for those who
invest in new clean energy resources-we would assert that this hardly
comprises a market with true "integrity."
Nor is investor confidence itself an absolute virtue. As FERC explained in
approving ISO-NE's market redesign, the goal of these markets is "to ensure
resource adequacy at just and reasonable rates"-in other words, to provide
reliable electricity as affordably as possible over time.68 Investor confidence is a
means to ensuring this end, but only under certain conditions. If a region is
substantially over-supplied with generation capacity, the market should not give
investors confidence that they will recover their investment costs-otherwise,
the region will end up with more generation than it needs, paid for by customers,
69
in contravention of FERC's obligations to protect consumers.
As it happens, electricity markets in both New England and the midAtlantic have substantially more generation than they need for reliability
purposes. 70 For this reason, these RTOs should be celebrating lower prices in

64.

See ConnecticutDep't of Pub. Util. Controlv. FERC, 569 F.3d 477, 481 (D.C. Cir.

65.

See PJM Order, supra note 26, at p. 91 (Glick, Comm'r, dissenting).

2009).
66.
On the impacts that capacity market reforms are likely to have on state clean energy
policies, see infra Part IV.

67.
See ISO-NE Order, supra note 31, at p. 68 (Glick, Comm'r, dissenting in part and
concurring in part) (questioning the aim of "investor confidence"); PJM Order, supra note 26, at p. 92
(Glick, Comm'r, dissenting) (observing that the majority order never defines market "integrity").
68.

Id.at19.

69.

FERC has previously explained the goal of market design reform as "ensur[ing] that

capacity prices will reflect the price needed to elicit new entry when new capacity is needed." PJM

Interconnection, L.L.C., 119 FERC

¶ 61,318

at P. 165 (2007) (quoting Devon Power LLC, 115 FERC

¶

61,340, at P. 113 (2006)) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Order on

Rehearing, 158 FERC ¶ 61,138, at P. 11 (2017) (describing the ideal capacity price as one that "provide[s]
an incentive to develop and retain a sufficient level of capacity to ensure reliability" while "protecting

customers from overpaying for that capacity" (emphasis added)).
70.
See North American Electricity Reliability Corporation, 2018 Summer Reliability
Assessment (May 30, 2018) at 20 (finding that ISO-NE has more than sufficient capacity reserve margins
that protect against reliability concerns), https://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Pages/default.aspx
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their capacity markets, rather than resisting them." If and when resource
adequacy again presents a challenge for these markets, prices in the markets
should accordingly rise, even with the unfettered participation of state-sponsored
renewables. 72

Ignoring these dynamics, RTOs have decided that protection of investor
interests-in other words, the assurance of certain levels of profit for fossil fuel
generators that might have prevailed in the absence of state preferences for clean
energy-trumps respect for democratically determined state requirements for
clean air and climate safety. This posture is particularly galling given the strange
institutional position that RTOs occupy as private entities, whose members are
predominantly for-profit companies in the electricity industry and whose
decision-making processes are generally not subject to the administrative law
requirements that apply to state and federal regulators. 73 No longer neutral grid
facilitators, a majority of FERC commissioners and the RTOs in the examples
discussed here appear to be taking the side of legacy corporations, working
against the public health and welfare.
B. The Ongoing Duty to Ensure Just and ReasonableRates
Although states control which power plants get built in their territories,
RTOs are not without tools to manage the markets that affect the costs of
competing choices. The Federal Power Act gives FERC authority over "rates and
practices" that "directly affect" federal markets, 74 allowing RTOs and the

[https://perma.cc/46A4-JQNU]; ISO-NE Transmittal Letter, supra note 37, at 11 ("[T]he region now has
significant excess capacity. . . "); PJM Transmittal Letter, supra note 45, at 36 ("[C]apacity commitments
in PJM are well above the installed reserve margin . . . "); id. at 24 (reporting PJM's reserve margin at
32.8%, more than double the reference margin of 16.1%). Reserve margins represent the extra generation
capacity available above and beyond the forecasted peak capacity demand in a given year and reference
margins are the levels needed to ensure resource adequacy. U.S. Energy Information Administration,
NERC 's Summer ReliabilityAssessment HighlightsSeasonal ElectricReliability Issues (June 29, 2018),
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=36592 [https://perma.cc/3PNJ-T8LL].
71.
See Comments of the Organization of PJM States, Inc., FERC Docket No. ER18-

1314-000, at 6 (May 7,2018) (urging FERC to reject both options) ("Rather than rising, there is significant
data that shows capacity prices should be falling.").
72.

See SYLWIA BIALEK & BURCIN UNEL, CAPACITY MARKETS AND EXTERNALITIES:

AVOIDING UNNECESSARY AND PROBLEMATIC REFORMS, INSTITUTE FOR POL'Y INTEGRITY 18 (2018)

[hereinafter IPI REPORT] (arguing that capacity markets that include state-supported resources will still

"self-correct" inthe event of an actual resource adequacy challenge). In fact, PJM's capacity market prices
did rise substantially in the region's most recent auction, without their proposed reforms in place. See
PJM, 2021/2022 RPM Base Residual Auction Results, at 6 (May 2018), http://www.pjm.com//media/markets-ops/rpm/rpm-auction-info/2021-2022/2021-2022-base-residual-auction-report.ashx
[https://perma.cc/4X5Y-MCGN].
73.

See

CHRISTINA

SIMEONE,

KLEINMAN

CTR.

FOR

ENERGY

POL'Y,

PJM

GOVERNANCE: CAN REFORMS IMPROVE OUTCOMES? 1, 22 (2017); Michael H. Dworkin & Rachel Aslin
Goldwasser, Ensuring Consideration of the Public Interest in the Governance and Accountability of
Regional Transmission Organizations, 28 ENERGY L.J. 543, 553 (2007); Shelley Welton, Electricity
Markets & the Social Project of Decarbonization, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1067 (2018).

74.
Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Electric Power Supply Ass'n, 136 S. Ct. 760,
774 (2016); see also Order on Rehearing, 158 FERC ¶ 61,138, at P. 7 (2017) ("The Commission has

119

Yale Journal on Regulation

Vol. 3 6, 2018

Commission to refine market rules to respond to state policy changes that render
market rates unjust or unreasonable. But on this score, it is unclear that either
ISO-NE's approved reform, or the Commission's new FRR proposal in PJM, is
a just and reasonable solution.7 5
The ISO-NE capacity market reforms will raise rates by billions of dollars
for consumers, as PJM's proposed reforms also would have. 6 The precise
impacts of FERC's PJM proposal are not yet known, but these reforms are also
designed to raise capacity prices and thus the expense to customers in the
region. In exchange for what? It remains unclear: neither FERC nor the RTOs
have identified any problem that the proposals are designed to solve, beyond
increasing capacity payments to non-clean energy resources.78 But since neither
region's market is currently having trouble attracting the investment it needs to
ensure reliability, it is hard to understand how increasing these payments is just
or reasonable.
As Commissioner Glick observed in his partial dissent to FERC's approval
of ISO-NE's reforms: "the fact that state policies are affecting matters within the
Commission's jurisdiction is not necessarily a problem for the Commission to
'solve,' but rather the natural consequence of Congressional intent." 79 And as he
further pointed out in dissenting from FERC's curious PJM decision, the
Commission continues to act upon nothing but a hunch that capacity markets
could theoretically be harmed, sometime in the future, by an influx of statesupported resources. 0 As of yet, however, no concrete evidence of actual
challenges to the grid's long-term reliability has been adduced." If FERC and
its RTOs believe that state policies create concrete resource adequacy concerns

acknowledged the right of states to pursue their own policy interests but must be mindful of state

regulatory actions that impinge on FERC-jurisdictional market mechanisms to set price.").
75.
See NRG Power Mktg., LLC v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 862 F.3d 108,
113 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (interpreting the roles of RTOs and FERC under FPA Section 205 filings); see also
16 U.S.C. § 824d (2018) (establishing the Commission's "just and reasonable" standard).
76.
One expert estimates that PJM's proposals will cost somewhere between $9.1
billion and $24.6 billion annually. See Protest of Clean Energy Advocates, FERC Docket No. ER18-1314,
at 7 (May 7, 2018).
77.

See PJM Order, supra note 26, at 12 (describing one key impetus for its reforms as

"lower auction clearing prices," thus implying that the goal is to raise auction clearing prices).
78.
Id. at p. 92 (Glick, Comm'r, dissenting) (arguing that FERC's order inappropriately
stymies state climate change policies, illegally "deploy[ing] the FPA to make it ever more difficult for
states to address this existential threat); see also PI Report, supra note 72, at i (finding "no conclusive
evidence that capacity markets are under threat"). To the extent that FERC has previously endorsed
generalized balancing efforts absent showing a particular market challenge, see, for example, New

England States Committee on Electricity v. ISO New England Inc., 142 FERC ¶ 61,108, at P. 35 (2013),
reh 'g denied, 151 FERC ¶ 61,056 (2015), we would urge the Commission to reconsider this precedent in
light of the growing tension it creates for states within regional markets.

79.

See ISO-NE Order, supra note 31, at p. 66 (Glick, Comm'r, dissenting in part and

concurring in part).

80.

See PJM Order, supra note 26, at pp. 95-96 (Glick, Comm'r, dissenting).

81.
Id. ("Today's order is all the more troubling because there is not substantial
evidence in the record to support a finding that there is a resource adequacy problem in PJM or that the

capacity market is otherwise unjust and unreasonable or unduly discriminatory or preferential.").
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that have not yet been voiced, then they should explicitly identify these
challenges and look for targeted solutions. Otherwise, the reforms on the table
appear to be an exceedingly complex and misguided effort to shield certain
market players from the impacts of personally disfavored but utterly legitimate
state policy goals.
IV.

Beyond Capacity Markets: The Risks of FERC Accepting RTOs'
Expanded Role

The big-picture implications of accepting RTOs' reforms have largely been
sidelined in the tussles over critical market design details. In this final Part, we
call attention to the ways in which these changes are likely to reduce the growth
of clean energy and threaten the delicate cooperative balance that FERC has
established with its state counterparts in the energy sector.
A. Slowing Down the Clean Energy Transition
In their reform proposals, both ISO-NE and PJM suggest that one of the
primary consequences of capacity market reforms will be to raise prices for
consumers forced to over-purchase capacity, because states are not likely to
eliminate their clean energy goals. 8 2 In the short-to-medium term, this
assumption probably holds. PJM, though, nods to potential longer-term
consequences, noting that some proponents of its minimum-offer-price reform
"hope that it will work to dis-incent states from providing subsidies in the first
instance." 83
We fear that PJM has the long-term diagnosis correct-and that all the
proposals on the table are likely to push in the direction of undermining state
clean energy policy preferences. Ultimately, to stabilize the global climate, the
electricity sector will need to approach zero emissions.84 That's a tall task for a
sector that currently produces 63% of its power from fossil fuels. 5 To date,
residents of the more ambitious clean energy states have proven willing to accept
some additional costs to meet these goals. But there may be a breaking point at
82.

See id. at 49; PJM Transmittal Letter, supra note 45, at 56; see also Request for

Rehearing of Clean Energy Advocates, FERC Docket No. ER18-619-000, at I (Apr. 9, 2018) (arguing
that "the predictable result" of ISO-NE's re-design is that "thousands of megawatts of clean energy will
be barred from accessing the ISO-NE capacity market, and the region's customers will be forced to spend
vast sums to buy an equivalent amount of redundant capacity.").
83.
84.

PJM Transmittal Letter, supra note 45, at 56 n.138.
INTERGOVT'L PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Summary for Policymakers, in

CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP III TO
THE FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 1, 20 (0.

Edenhofer et al. eds., 2014) ("In the majority of low-stabilization scenarios, the share of low-carbon
electricity supply. . . increases from the current share of approximately 30 percent to more than 80 percent
by 2050, and fossil fuel power generation without [carbon capture and storage] is phased out almost

entirely by 2100.").
85.
Frequently
Asked
Questions,
ENERGY
INFO.
https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=427&t=3 [https://perma.cc/9ME4-QDPP].

ADMIN.,

121

Yale Journal on Regulation

Vol. 3 6, 2018

which the pendulum of public sentiment swings the other way, should the costs
of the transition rise too high-especially since some states are currently
shouldering all the burden of greenhouse gas emissions cuts while their
neighbors shirk. By raising the cost to ambitious states of meeting their energy
goals by potentially hundreds of millions of dollars, 6 the capacity market
reforms under consideration could cause a backlash against ambitious state
policies. At the same time, these reforms prop up fossil fuel resources at the
expense of customers in many states whose democratically elected
representatives chose a different path-clean energy.
We write this Essay at a time of significant uncertainty with respect to how
PJM's market reforms will play out, and therefore we must acknowledge that
there is a scenario in which our concerns regarding the Commission's proposed
reforms might be overblown. Some commentators have suggested that the
reforms could prove a surprising boon for clean energy by allowing states more
flexibility in deciding which resources should supply capacity directly to in-state
utilities, and which should participate in regional capacity markets." Others echo
concerns similar to those expressed in this Essay, arguing for an outcome that
respects state policy autonomy and more adequately compensates statesupported renewable and nuclear energy resources." Currently, a utility must be
either "all out," or "all in," with respect to capacity market participation; in
contrast, under the next phase of FERC's PJM Order, the Commission might
allow utilities to pursue clean energy capacity procurement outside the capacity
market, turning to the capacity market only for whatever fraction of their
capacity needs remain.8 9 But this result will obtain only if FERC allows states
substantial flexibility in determining how to match renewable energy supply with
load in ways that allow renewable resources to make up the payments lost from
the capacity market, in addition to being compensated for their renewable
attributes.
Given the Commission's demonstrated antipathy to state clean energy
policy and its aggressive timeline for reform, we are skeptical that the
Commission will design a program that treats clean energy resources fairly in
light of their full social benefits. But we strongly encourage the Commission to

86.
87.

See Protest of Clean Energy Advocates, supra note 76.
Gavin Bade, How FERC's 'Unprecedented'PJM Order Could Unravel Capacity

Markets, UTILITY DIVE (July 3, 2018) (quoting analysts' suggestions that an opt-out "Fixed Resource
Requirement" (FRR) rule could enable state-supported clean energy resources to bypass the punitive
capacity market entirely), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/how-fercs-unprecedented-pjm-order-couldunravel-capacity-markets/527053/ [https://perma.cc/UH5J-CXDG]; see also PJM Order, supra note 26,

at

¶¶ 160-62 (describing how

a "resource-specific FRR alternative" might operate).

88.
Ann McCabe and Miles Farmer, How FERC Can Protect Customers and Respect
State Energy Policy Authority in its PJM Capacity Market Proceeding, UTILITY DIVE (Sept. 25, 2018),
available
at
https://www.utilitydive.com/news/how-ferc-can-protect-customers-and-respect-stateenergy-policy-authority-in/533095/ [https://perma.cc/B9VD-NKU9].
89.
See PJM Order, supra note 26, at 170 (explaining that utilities may currently enter

and exit the capacity market only on a "utility-wide basis," but that under the new proposal, a utility could
"remove a specific resource").
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prove us wrong. For example, FERC might allow states to self-determine which
resources to pull from capacity markets and might then devise a collaborative
scheme in which these resources could be reasonably compensated for both their
capacity provisioning and environmental attributes. This flexibility would go a
long way towards easing the jurisdictional tension at the heart of this Essayalthough largely by facilitating a de facto withdrawal from regional capacity
markets. 90 While this outcome might seem problematic to those who had hoped
to see regional capacity markets support a robust approach to resource adequacy,
in our view, shifting the responsibility of maintaining resource adequacy back to
the states may be the only sensible path remaining in light of FERC's unfortunate
decision to punish state-supported resources in capacity markets.
B. Implicationsfor RTOs Without Capacity Markets
It might be tempting to dismiss the East Coast policy debates as matters
that only affect RTOs with mandatory capacity markets, in which utilities must
participate to fulfill their regionally assigned resource adequacy obligations. 91
(In other regions, including the Midwest and California, no such rigid construct
exists; capacity markets are voluntary in the Midwest and non-existent in
California, which manages resource adequacy via other mechanisms. 92 ) But this
response misses the mark. The capacity market reform debates currently
underway are only the latest episode in a longer battle for policy-making control
between private market operators, state regulators, and FERC. If RTOs are
empowered by FERC to propose market designs that punish state clean energy
policies in capacity markets, what is to stop them from taking a similar approach
in energy markets? In our view, the question of RTO governance should be front
and center, no matter the market. To paraphrase Sinclair Lewis, those who say
"it can't happen here" fail to acknowledge that, at least as far as the governance
concerns discussed in this Essay go, "it has already happened there."
Even if the impacts of the shift in governance illustrated by the ISO-NE and
PJM reforms remain limited to RTOs with mandatory capacity markets-a

90.
See ISO-NE Order, supra note 31, at pp. 58-59 (LaFleur, Comm'r, concurring)
(expressing concern that overly blunt capacity market reforms may lead to utilities exiting RTOs and
states re-regulating markets); PJM Order, supra note 26, at p. 86 (LaFleur, Comm'r, dissenting) (same).

91.

Some regions with ostensibly "mandatory" markets do offer exit options under

stringent conditions, usually requiring a utility to exit the capacity market entirely for a multi-year period.
See PJM, Fixed Resource Requirement Alternative-Overview (Sept. 17, 2017), https://www.pjm.com//media/comniittees-groups/task-forces/ccppstf/20170817/20170817-fixed-resource-requirementoverview.ashx [https://perma.cc/CZ4A-44GB]; see also Bushnell et al., supra note 20, at 26-27
(describing the mandatory capacity market construct and exceptions to it).

92.

California currently sets its own "resource adequacy" requirements that utilities can

meet through self-supply or bilateral contracting. The Midcontinental ISO runs a non-mandatory capacity
market, which utilities can use as a backstop to self-supply or bilateral contracting. See id. at 25-26

(describing California's and the Midwest's capacity schemes); see also Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys.
Operator, Inc., 153 FERC ¶ 61,229, at P. 46 (2015) (refusing to make MISO's capacity market mandatory
in response to a petition under Section 206 of the Federal Power Act).
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containment we find implausible-this is little comfort. Capacity markets
themselves are the result of market operators exerting increased control over
state regulators: states whose markets now feature centralized capacity markets
first joined energy-only regional markets, only gradually acceding to a construct
in which the RTO also controlled resource adequacy after the decision to
delegate their market governance to the RTO had been made. Previously, some
PJM and ISO-NE states expressed serious reservations about the creation of
mandatory capacity markets, which they worried would interfere with states'
historical right to choose their mix of power plants. 93 But states' objections didn't
stop FERC from eventually ordering the RTOs to construct new systems that
went beyond bilateral resource adequacy requirements.94 Subsequently, FERC
negotiated settlements between each RTO and its stakeholders that established
centralized capacity markets in 2006.95
As the history of capacity market formation in ISO-NE and PJM indicates,
states within RTOs-whether single- or multi-state-do not have unfettered
control over whether FERC might eventually decide that a centralized capacity
market is required to satisfy the Federal Power Act's "just and reasonable"
ratemaking standards. 96 Because the decision of whether to require a capacity
market "directly affects" wholesale rates, FERC maintains jurisdiction in this
domain. 97 Certainly state wishes matter, but as PJM and ISO-NE states' recent
experiences illustrate, a majority of today's FERC Commissioners feels free to
disregard them. Thus, even where state law might ostensibly preclude
participation in a centralized capacity market, an RTO-or any private party,
such as an out-of-state generator in the regional market-might nevertheless
propose a centralized capacity market to FERC.
Should such a proposal be made, the identity of the proposing party is
legally significant. When an outside party petitions FERC for a change in an
RTO's rules, FERC must find the current market structure "unjust" or
"unreasonable" to force a change upon an RTO under Section 206 of the Federal

93.
Harvard Electricity Law Initiative, Comment of the Harvard Electricity Law
Initiative to FERC re: PJM Interconnection, Revisions to Address Impacts of State Policies, FERC Docket

No. ER18-1314 (May 7, 2018).
94.
Conn. Dept. of Pub. Util. Control v. FERC, 569 F.3d 477, 480 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
(dismissing state challenge to ISO-NE's authority to determine an installed capacity requirement to drive
a regional forward capacity market); PJM Interconnection LLC, 115 FERC ¶ 61,079, at P. 1 (2006)
(concluding, in response to a filing under Section 206 of the Federal Power Act, that PJM's previous
system of bilateral resource adequacy requirements was no longer "just and reasonable"); Devon Power
LLC, et al., 103 FERC ¶ 61,082, at P. 29 (2003) (ordering ISO-NE to create a "market-type mechanism"
as a superior method of managing regional resource adequacy).

95.
PJM Interconnection LLC, 117 FERC ¶ 61,331, at P. 6 (2007); Devon Power LLC,
115 FERC ¶61,340, at P. 2 (2006)
96.
16 U.S.C. §§ 824d(a), 824e(a) (2018).
97.
See, e.g., PJM Interconnection LLC, 119 FERC ¶ 61,318, at P. 42 (2007) (finding
that resource adequacy and resource requirements in PJM "directly affect" wholesale rates subject to the
Commission's jurisdiction); see also supra note 74 and accompanying text (explaining "directly
affecting" jurisdiction).
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Power Act. 98 In contrast, when an RTO itself petitions for a change to its market
structure under section 205 of the Act, FERC need only find that the RTO's new
proposal is one among potentially many "just and reasonable" alternatives. 99 For
this reason, RTO-sanctioned proposals are more likely to win FERC approvalmaking RTO composition and governance central to any analysis of the potential
for a regional capacity market.
Already, private parties that have taken note of the capacity market reforms
in the East are seeking to expand these markets' footprint. A natural gas power
plant recently petitioned FERC to declare California's current resource adequacy
regime "unjust and unreasonable" under Section 206 of the Federal Power Act
and replace it with a centralized capacity market."0 Although the Commission
may well refuse this outside request, the filing nevertheless indicates how the
Commission, not the state, has the final word on capacity market formation. 101
At its core, the history of capacity markets indicates that no state within an
RTO can insulate itself from the possibility that its RTO may ultimately
pursue-or be forced to accept-market changes that FERC deems just and
reasonable. Critically, the RTO's position on proposed changes determines the
legal standard under which FERC reviews market proposals. Accordingly, states
wary of the recent FERC decisions regarding ISO-NE and PJM capacity markets
would be wise to focus on RTO governance as an important channel for
preserving and accommodating state resource preferences-a topic to which we
turn in our final subsection. Yet even a governance structure that precludes an
RTO from proposing a capacity market to FERC cannot prevent FERC from
declaring the RTO's approach to resource adequacy unjust or unreasonable, and
possibly even ordering a capacity market in its place.
C. Implicationsfor Californiaand the West
Thus far, we have only considered the ways in which capacity marketspresent and potential-can stymie the clean energy goals of their participating
states. But the precedents that FERC has established with respect to PJM and
ISO-NE capacity markets are likely to have reverberations that extend far beyond
the question of capacity market design. The broader trend of regional RTOs
asserting their primacy over state policy preferences-as FERC has sanctioned

98.
16 U.S.C. § 824e(a) (2018).
99.
Id. at § 824d(a).
100.
CXA La Paloma, LLC v. California Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., FERC Docket No.
ELI 8-177 (June 20, 2018).
101.
To help resolve this uncertainty, we would encourage FERC to articulate a clear
principle for whether and under what conditions the Commission might consider imposing a capacity
market under Section 206 of the Federal Power Act. Ultimately, however, so long as the Commission
asserts jurisdiction to review resource adequacy requirements under Section 206-as it has done in
previous capacity market decisions for ISO-NE, PJM, and MISO-any such principle would be a
Commission policy, not a jurisdictional limitation, and therefore subject to change.
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in recent months-threatens the conditions under which states with divergent
environmental policies can cooperate in regional electricity markets.
The most prominent example of expanded regional cooperation concerns
California, which has a federally regulated wholesale electricity market, and the
rest of the West, which does not. Currently, the California Independent System
Operator (CAISO) operates an energy market that covers most of the state and a
small portion of Southern Nevada.102 For several years, California policymakers
have considered expanding CAISO's footprint to include other states' utilities,
forming a regional energy market similar to those in place in PJM and ISONE. 103 Advocates of regionalization argue that a broader market will facilitate
increased and more efficient renewable energy deployment by integrating the
broader region's renewable resources and allowing renewables in California to
sell their excess power to neighboring states. 104 However, it is widely understood
that other states would not join a regional CAISO without a significant change
in CAISO's governance structure.
Such a change would carry with it the risk of increasing regional and
private-sector influence over California's clean energy trajectory, as is occurring
in the ISO-NE and PJM states. Currently, each of CAISO's five Governors is
appointed by the Governor of California and subject to confirmation by the
California Senate-a unique arrangement that may not be possible to recreate
under current FERC regulations.105 What would happen if this arrangement
changed is an open and critical question. The integration of state policy priorities
in the management of CAISO's energy markets is among the most complex in
the country, which makes the close alignment between the current CAISO
governance structure and state political structure extremely relevant. CAISO also
manages a voluntary regional energy market called the Energy Imbalance
Market (EIM), which includes portions of Oregon, Washington, Idaho, Nevada,
Arizona, Utah, and Wyoming 1 6-a list that includes several interior states that
102.
Technically, CAISO is not a single-state market, although it is governed like one.
Not all of California is in CAISO territory; CAISO territory also includes a small portion of southern
Nevada.
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CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 359.5 (as added by Senate Bill 350, Stats. 2015, Ch. 547,

§ 13).
104.
See,
e.g.,
Frequently
Asked
Questions,
FIX
THE
GRID,
https://www.fixthegridcalifornia.org/frequently-asked-questions/ [https://perma.cc/J6ZA-2D2Y].
105.
CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 337 (defining the appointment process for CAISO
Governors). FERC originally disapproved of this governance structure, ordering California to replace its
state-appointed Governors with representatives determined by a private governance structure. See Order
Concerning Governance of the California Independent System Operator, 100 FERC ¶ 61,059 (2002).
CAISO successfully challenged this order, which the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals vacated two years

later. See Calif. Ind. System Operator v. FERC, 372 F.3d 395 (D.C. Cir. 2004). Although the court left
open the possibility that FERC could de-certify the current CAISO governance structure under FERC's
Order 888, FERC never took any such action and CAISO continues to operate under the formerly disputed
governance structure. Although the status quo approach seems workable given CAISO's track record of
performance, it is an open question whether any future ISO or RTO could be structured with stateappointed governance-at least not without a change in FERC policy.
106.
Governance of the CAISO EIM is shared with participating states. See Lenhart et

al., supra note 18. But CAISO maintains exclusive control over California's core energy markets.
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explicitly prefer coal, in contrast to the low-carbon preferences of their coastal
neighbors.
To date, CAISO has deftly managed the challenging politics of being a
regional trailblazer on climate change. Most notably, CAISO secured the first
FERC-approved carbon price, integrating California's cap-and-trade program
into the EIM market tariff such that the carbon price applies to electricity
voluntarily exported from the EIM territory to serve CAISO load.107 After nearly
two years of negotiations with the state climate regulator, CAISO has transmitted
a greenhouse gas accounting mechanism for the regional EIM market to FERC,
which is reviewing the petition as of this writing.108 CAISO has done all of this
under its power to petition FERC for market changes the Commission finds to
be "just and reasonable" 109-a power that has worked to the good of California
climate policy in a context where the RTO's goals are aligned with those of state
policymakers.
CAISO deserves enormous credit for the work that has gone into navigating
the technical and legal issues that arise when trying to fully account for the net
greenhouse gas emissions impacts of cross-border carbon pricing. However, it is
critical to observe that this work has occurred in a context where CAISO's entire
Board of Governors is fundamentally accountable to the state political process.
Would this work continue unperturbed if the control of CAISO governance
shifted to appointees made by states or private parties without a longstanding
commitment to clean energy and climate policy-or even a demonstrated

107.

Generators located in California automatically include carbon prices in their

CAISO bids because they are subject to California's cap-and-trade program. Generators outside the state
decide whether to bid to supply electricity to CAISO on a voluntary basis; they are only dispatched to
serve CAISO load if they affirmatively elect to do so and submit a winning bid that includes a

supplemental greenhouse gas bid adder reflecting California's carbon price. For an overview, see Andy
Coghlan & Danny Cullenward, State ConstitutionalLimitations on the Future of California's Carbon
Market, 37 ENERGY L.J. 219 (2016); see also CAISO Tariff § 29.32 (Feb. 15, 2018),
http://www.caiso.com/rules/Pages/Regulatory/Default.aspx
[https://perma.cc/FC6X-HJCN]; CAISO,
Regional Integration California Greenhouse Gas Compliance Issue Paper (Aug. 29, 2016),
http://www.caiso.com/Documents/IssuePaperRegionallntegrationCaliforniaGreenHouseGasCompliance.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QWN3-XCHQ]; see
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XCHQ]. However, questions remain about the efficacy of the EIM design. See, e.g., William W. Hogan,
An Efficient Energy Imbalance Market with Conflicting Carbon Policies, 30(10) ELECTRICITY J. 8 (2017).

Professor Hogan's analysis concerned an earlier version of the proposed greenhouse gas accounting
mechanism, but it raises several conceptual issues that remain in CAISO's subsequent proposal and
California's treatment of imported electricity in its cap-and-trade program for greenhouse gases.
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See 16 U.S.C. § 824d (2018).
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antipathy towards climate policy?110 Would a new governance structure continue
to support the application of California's carbon price to imports from within the
broader regional market? If not, what would prevent coal-fired generators in
neighboring states from selling their power to California customers, thereby
undercutting California's climate goals? And even if a regional RTO were
formed with a governance structure that preserves California's interests
alongside those of its neighbors, regionalization still might create greater
practical risks of FERC's meddling. Given the many market rules necessary to
accommodate disparate state regulatory regimes, and the enlarged pool of
players in a regional RTO, a regional market has more potentially dissatisfied
market participants that might petition FERC to declare the RTO's market design
unjust or unreasonable.
In our view, California policymakers should acknowledge the mounting
evidence that regional market operators are no longer required to be neutral
"takers" of state policy preferences, as exemplified by the experiences in PJM
and ISO-NE. The shift in power towards private market regulators increases the
risks that a regional market operator could work to undermine the progress that
CAISO and state regulators have achieved to date. Similarly, the hostility to state
clean energy policies from FERC raises questions about what guarantees state
law can offer in advance of FERC's review of an expanded market design
proposal. Given the inability of state law to constrain FERC's review of RTO
market designs-either on its own initiative, or at the petition of any market
participant-many of our questions cannot be resolved through legal guarantees.
Rather, their resolution would instead be contingent on the political economy of
electricity markets and the policy perspectives FERC's commissioners bring to
future regulatory disputes.
In our view, the potential gains of an enlarged, regional RTO are significant
and should be considered alongside the governance risks outlined above. We
make no judgment here about whether regionalization is worth pursuing on
balance, and if so, under what conditions and institutional forms. Our aim is
simply to bring to the regionalization conversation an account of the increasing
risks that confront states whose policy preferences are not respected by those
who participate in or govern their electricity markets.

110.
Tom Lutey, Coal States Montana and Wyoming Push Back on Washington State
Proposed Carbon Tax, BILLINGs GAZETTE (Feb. 21, 2018) (reporting that the Attorneys General of

Montana and Wyoming sent a letter to Washington Governor Jay Inslee asserting that Washington's
proposed carbon tax raises constitutional concerns); Brian Maffly, Lawmakers Considering Spending
Millions to Sue California and Fight the 'War on Utah Coal', SALT LAKE TRIB. (Feb. 18, 2018),
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Legislature was considering a $2M appropriation to fund a lawsuit against California's climate policies,
including its application of the carbon price in the CAISO EIM); Letter from Tim Fox, Montana Attorney
General, and Peter K. Michael, Wyoming Attorney General, to Governor Jay Inslee (Feb. 20, 2018),
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V. The Delicate Future of Energy Federalism
Energy federalism is in flux following a string of three recent Supreme
Court cases that re-considered the state-federal relationship in energy law.' In
decades past, the Supreme Court interpreted the Federal Power Act to draw a
"bright line, easily ascertained" between federal and state spheres of control. 112
That understanding no longer holds in the modem world of energy markets. In
Hughes, Justice Sotomayor described the Act as a "collaborative federalism
statute[], [which] envisions a federal-state relationship marked by
interdependence." 113 As this jurisprudential evolution suggests, states and FERC
are still finding their way in regional energy markets. This challenge is unfolding
in rapidly changing conditions, as states within RTOs also happen to be some of
the most ambitious supporters of clean energy.
Regional energy markets hold the potential to play an important role in
states' clean energy transitions. We count ourselves among those who view welldesigned regional markets as vital tools for integrating higher quantities of
variable wind and solar resources on the grid. As a further testament to RTOs'
success, most of the states involved in the recent acrimony over capacity markets
have professed their desire to preserve these regional constructs, even as they
oppose onerous capacity market reforms 114-although New Jersey's utility
regulator recently expressed willingness to contemplate leaving PJM.1 s
Nevertheless, East Coast states' faith in RTO governance has clearly been
shaken."' Some are frustrated that ISO-NE ignored key components of the
regional compromise reached in advance of its filing with FERC." PJM more
brazenly put forward two proposals to FERC that each failed to earn stakeholder
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or state support: in fact, a majority of stakeholders and states preferred "no
action" to either of PJM's alternatives.118
FERC, for its part, approved the controversial ISO-NE proposal and called
for even more substantial reform of the PJM market on a timeline that will leave
little space for state engagement, leading some to predict that the reforms that
FERC demands within PJM may portend an "unraveling" of the region's
capacity market.119 With this move, the Commission is signaling more strongly
than ever that participation in its markets may well come at the expense of state
policy priorities. That is a message that few states are likely to want to hearand it may upset the fundamental balance of state-federal and public-private
relations that sustains energy market constructs today.
To preserve the neutral, well-functioning markets FERC has created and
nourished over the past two decades, the Commission should stop pretending
that regional electricity markets are a pristine construct under siege from state
clean energy goals. These markets are merely a tool in the larger project of
ensuring "just and reasonable" electricity rates in the United States-subject to
any constraints states and other actors impose on them through legitimate legal
means. Climate change is an existential problem and mustering the political will
to tackle it is no small feat. FERC must not allow nebulous appeals to preserving
"investor confidence" or "market integrity"-which in reality mask certain
generators' attempt to use private energy markets to end-run state political
processes-to stand in the way of states' efforts. If FERC does, states would be
wise to reevaluate who really controls their energy mix-and whether that's an
arrangement their citizens can afford to endure.
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